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1. Introduction 
Achievements in an Event Semantics 
Christopher Pifion 
Universitiit Dusseldorf 
The category of achievements forms one of the four cornerstones of Vendler ' s  
( 1 967) aspectual classification, among accomplishments, activities, and states .  
Examples of  achievement verbs are given in ( 1 ) .  
( I )  arrive, be born, begin, convince, depart, die, discover, find, forget, hear, 
leave, lose, notice, realize, recognize, resume, see, stop, strike oil ,  win 
A long-standing intu i tion about achievements is that they denote instantaneous 
events. In Vendler' s words, achievements 'occur at a single moment'  (p .  1 03 )  and 
' involve unique and definite time instants ' (p. 1 07) .  S imilarly ,  Freed ( 1 979, p. 5 1 ) 
states that ' [a]n ach ievement essential ly names an event that has no duration . '  
Putting the same point in  yet another way, Mourelatos ( 1 98 1 ,  p .  1 92) writes that 
achievements 'can be indefinitely placed within a temporal stretch, but they cannot in 
themselves occur over or throughout a temporal stretch . '  The instantaneity that 
these authors speak of is palpable in the following sentences : 
(2) a. Rebecca reached the summit at twelve o'clock sharp. 
b .  Anita recognized Peter the moment he entered the room. 
In (2a), Rebecca ' s  reaching (attainment) of the summit occurred exactly at twelve 
o' clock-it did not l ast  several moments, the final of which was the transition to 
1 2 :00. S imi larly ,  in (2b) ,  Anita' s recogn ition of Peter took place the moment he 
entered-no sooner, no later, and certainly no longer. 
But do achievements really denote instantaneous events? A positive answer 
requires there to be instantaneous events, and yet this is open to doubt . I f  achieve­
ments denote events and events are changes, then assuming that changes require 
longer than an instant to transpire , !  it fol lows that there are no strictly instantaneous 
events . Consequently, achievements denote at best very short events , and the charac­
terizations offered by Vendler, Freed, and Mourelatos should be charitably under­
stood as impressionistic . 
However, thi s  conclusion may be too hasty . Let us grant that changes take 
time, however short. What can then be questioned is whether all events are changes. 
States, presumably, are not changes, but this is not what I have in mind. Imagine that 
there are instantaneous events which-while not changes themselves-nonetheless 
presuppose changes i n  their immediate vicinity . The presupposition in question is  
above al l  ontological: because of what they are, instantaneous events are such as to 
require the existence of other types of events in order to exist themselves. I will 
argue that there are such instantaneous events and that they can serve as the denotata 
of achievements. 
While (finite) events come in different sizes, they all have beginnings and 
endings. We could take beginnings and endings to be extended events in their own 
right, as the earlier and later parts of a larger event, respectively .  However, it cannot 
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be denied that an event also begins to take place at some instant and finishes taking 
place at another (Chisholm ( 1 982)) .  Now recall the scenario from ( l a) :  Rebecca 
climbs all morning and reaches the summit at twelve o'clock sharp. Never mind that 
we are not actually able to calculate the exact instant at which she reaches the 
summit. Forget also that there is a good deal of arbitrariness in determining the 
precise bounds of the summit. The point is simply that once we stipulate the bounds 
of the summit and decide on an interval (however short) which covers the ending of 
the climbing, we have no conceptual difficulty in imagining that the Rebecca' s 
cl imbing to the summit terminates with her reaching of the summit and that the 
reaching is instantaneous, falling within the said interval . In other words, there is no 
conceptual problem in taking the reaching of the summit-as the ending of the 
climb to the summit-to be arbitrarily short. 
The logic of achievements is in fact the logic of beginnings and endings . 
And it seems that beginnings and endings must satisfy two basic requirements if 
they are to count as beginnings and endings at al l .  The first i s  that the beginning 
(ending) of an event of type X not be immediately preceded (followed) by an event 
of the same type . For example, if Rebecca begins to climb, then she was not climb­
ing immediately before. The second requirement is that the beginning (ending) of an 
event of type X be part of an event of the same type that stretches temporally to the 
right (left) . Keeping with our example, if Rebecca begins to climb, then she climbs 
for a while immediately thereafter-not necessarily for a long while, of course, but 
for at least a good deal longer than an instant. 
Consider now how achievement verbs like reach and recognize are amenable 
to thi s  sort of analysis .  Take recognize: it plausibly denotes beginn ings of states of 
recogniz ing .2 Accordingly, if Anita suddenly recogni zes Peter, then there is a 
beginning of a state in which she recognizes him. As required, thi s  state stretches 
temporally to the right and its beginning is not immediately preceded by a state in 
which she recognizes him. The verb reach, I suggest, denotes endings of motion 
events that are also beginnings of states. If Rebecca reaches the summit, then there is 
a ending of a motion event in which she climbs to the summit. However, that ending 
is  at the same time the beginning of a state in which she is at the summit . As 
necessary, Rebecca 's  climbing to the summit stretches temporally to the left and its 
ending is not immediately followed by an event in which she climbs to the summit. 
Moreover, her being at the summit stretches temporally to the right and its beginning 
is not immediately preceded by a state in which she is at the summit. 
The formalization of th i s  analysis of achievements is problematic in current 
versions of event semantics (e .g . ,  Krifka ( 1 989) ,  Parsons ( 1 990)) .  The central 
difficulty, no surprise, l ies in the introduction of instantaneous events--events that 
are located in time but which do not take up any time at all .  Event semantics does not 
standardly assume the existence of such events . The analysis that I develop in 
section 3, in which I present a two-sorted event ontology for event semantics, 
radically changes al l of this. The two sorts are introduced there as happenings and 
boundary happenings. Happen ings correspond more or less to the fami l iar collec­
tion of (thick) eventual ities;3 boundary happenings are the new (thin) citizens-in a 
word, they are the boundaries of happenings .  Concomitant with this  expl ic i t  
reification of boundaries i s  a sh ift from a purely mereological framework to a 
mereotopological one in which happenings and boundary happen ings may and in 
fact do play according to different rules. 
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2. Diagnosing Achievements 
At the outset, let me fix some terminology. I use the term 'achievement' to designate 
a class of verbal projections (Vs, VPs, and IPs) that pattern alike with respect to an 
inventory of aspectual tests .4 This usage does not commit me to a particular denota­
tion for achievements. However, since I presuppose an event semantics, I do assume 
that achievements denote properties of eventualities.5 Whether these properties form 
an aspectuaIly significant natural class or sort is of course what is at issue. In what 
follows, I present four pieces of evidence in favor of treating achievements as an 
aspectual category in their own right. In each case, I argue that the key to under­
standing the pattern is the instantaneity of the eventualities denoted by achievements. 
2. 1 .  Time-Span Adverbials 
Although achievements are compatible with time-span adverbials ( i .e . ,  in-adverbials), 
the latter do not measure the smallest interval during which the described eventuali ty 
takes place, but rather a contextually determined interval at the end of which it takes 
place. 
(3)  a Rebecca reached the summit in five hours (in a split second). 
b. Anita recognized Peter in five minutes (in a fraction of a second) . 
c .  Mary arrived in an hour (in a moment) . 
Evidence for th is  role of time-span adverbials with ach ievements is their close 
synonymy with after-adverbials, as the close synonymy between the sentences in (3) 
and (4) attests. 
(4) a. Rebecca reached the summit after five hours (after a split second). 
b .  Anita recognized Peter after five minutes (after a fraction of a second). 
c .  Mary arrived after an hour (after a moment). 
The close synonymy between time-span adverbials and after-adverbials is 
absent with accompl ishments, as seen in (5) .6 
(5 ) a. Rebecca wrote a letter to the president in an hour. 
Not synonymous with : Rebecca wrote a letter to the president after an 
hour. 
b. Anita proved the theorem in twenty minutes. 
Not synonymous with : Anita proved the theorem after twenty minutes .  
If achievements denote instantaneous eventualities, then these eventualities 
l i teral ly have no temporal extent to be measured. Time-span adverbials ,  when they 
measure the smallest interval during which the described eventual i ty takes place, 
presuppose a temporal extent, however short. It is this conflict between the actual 
lack of a temporal extent with achievements and the presupposition that there is one 
with time-span adverbials that accounts for why. the latter do not have the same 
function with achievements as they do with accompl ishments. 
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2.2.  Progressivity 
A standard objection to the view that achievements denote instantaneous eventualities 
is the observation that many (though not a1 1 )  achievements occur in the progressive: 
(6) a Rebecca was reaching the summit when it began to rain. 
b .  # Anita was recognizing Peter when I walked in. 
c. Astrid was winning the race when we arrived. 
d .  Are you finding everything okay?6 
e .  We visited the wounded soldier, who was dying. 
Sure ly ,  the objection goes , progressive clauses do not describe instantaneous 
eventual ities, hence the compatibil ity of the progressive with achievements strongly 
suggests that latter do not describe instantaneous eventualities either. 
The occurrence of achievements in the progressive is indeed a puzzle, but it 
alone does not constitute a counterexample to the claim that achievements denote 
instantaneous eventualities unless an analysis is offered of the progressive with 
achievements that is incompatible with this claim. I know of no such analys is .  In 
fact ,  I believe that it is possible to turn the tables and use the compatibility of the 
progressive with achievements (when i t  is  compatible) as further support for the 
claim that achievements form an aspectual category in their own right. 
A largely underappreciated point about achievements in the progressive is 
that there i s  always an unpredictable meaning shift implicated. Some achievements 
appear so often in the progressive that it is hard to see thi s  unpredictable shift at 
first, yet I claim that it is nevertheless present. Consider the examples in (6) . In (6a) ,  
was reaching may be paraphrased as  'was approaching' : it is not the actual attain­
ment of the summit that was in progress .  In (6c) ,  was winning the race has 'was 
ahead in the race' as a paraphrase-the winning itself was clearly not in progress . 
The question in (6d) may be rephrased as ' Is your search for what you are looking 
for going well ?' . Again ,  it is not the eventual ity described by the achievement (here: 
a finding) that is in progress. Finally, was dying in (6e) may be paraphrased as 'was 
suffering and on the verge of death ' :  the death itself was not in progress. 
In a11 of these cases, the eventual ities described by the achievements in  the 
progressive are simply not of the same type as the eventual ities described by the 
achievements alone . Furthermore, it is difficult  to see how the mean ing shifts 
involved are completely predictable. In each case, there seems to be an element of 
irreducible lexicalization involved. Why, for example, can we not refer to a captured 
spy in her final minutes before committing suicide as someone who is dying? If 
achievements denote instantaneous eventualities, then we do not expect semantically 
regular progressives to be possible, precisely because eventualities without duration 
are never in progress. 
2.3. No Partial Completion 
Achievements are incompatible with adverbs expressing that the described eventuali­
ty is partially completed or real ized: 
(7) a. # Rebecca partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) reached the summit. 
b .  # Anita partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) recognized Peter. 
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c. # Astrid partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) won the race. 
d. # The patient partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) died. 
If achievements denote instantaneous eventual i ties, then this  incompatibi l i ty i s  
expected: since such eventualities have no proper parts, no part ial realization i s  
possible. 
Accomplishments, in  contrast, typically (although not always) exhibit no 
conflict with such adverbs: 
(8) a. Rebecca partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) wrote a letter to the 
president. 
b .  Anita partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) proved the theorem. 
c. # The lifeguard partly (partially, half, partway, halfway) rescued Peter. 
However, even when there is a conflict, as in (8c), the nature of the unacceptabil ity 
differs from the one in (7). In addition to duration, adverbs l ike partly, etc. arguably 
presuppose a certain kind of divisibility for the types of eventualities in question.? 
Letters standardly have parts that are written separately ;  theorems often have parts 
that are proven separately; but people normally do not have parts that are rescued 
separately (although this is not unimaginable in gruesome accidents). Indeed, a 
sentence such as Unfortunately, Rebecca only partly rescued her dissertation after 
it fell out the window sounds unexceptional . 
If this line of analysis is correct, then achievements are doubly out, as far as 
th is class of adverbs is concerned: the eventualities that they denote are instanta­
neous, a fortiori no divisibility of the kind suggested is possible. 
2.4. Intentionality and Manner 
Achievements are incompatible with adverbs expressing that the referent of the 
subject NP participated intentionally in the described eventuality :  
(9) a. # Rebecca intentionally (attentively , conscientiously, studiously, vigilantly) 
reached the summit. 
b. # Anita intentionally (attentively, conscientiously, studiously, vigilantly) 
recognized Peter. 
c. # Astrid intentionally (attentively, conscientiously, studiously, vigilantly) 
arrived. 
In (9a), Rebecca may have intentionally climbed to the summit or even intended to 
reach it, but her attainment of the summit was not carried out intentionally. Similarly, 
in (9c) ,  Astrid may have done any number of th ings leading up to her arrival 
intentionally, but her very arrival was not performed intentionally . 
Perhaps more surpri s ing is the fact that achievements disallow manner 
adverbs in their eventuality-related interpretation : 
( 1 0) a. # Rebecca quickly (slowly) reached the summit. 
b .  # Anita quickly (slowly) recognized Peter. 
c. # Astrid quickly (slowly) won the race . 
d. # The patient died quickly (slowly). 
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The intended reading of these sentences is that the eventualities described unfold 
quickly (slowly) and not that a short (long) period of time elapses before they take 
place . In ( l Oa) , Rebecca may have been quick (slow) to reach the summit, but this 
crucially pertains to how quickly (slowly) she climbed and not to the reaching itself. 
Likewise, in ( l Od), the patient ' s  condition may have quickly (slowly) deteriorated 
before resulting in death, but the death itself was neither quick nor slow. 
The idea that achievements denote instantaneous eventualities can be used to 
shed light on such data. Intuitively ,  it is reasonable to think that any sort of inten­
tional activity or act takes time, if only a short time. Since instantaneous eventualities 
have zero duration, they lack the temporal extent required for intentional activity . The 
lack of a temporal extent also accounts for why instantaneous eventualities cannot be 
judged as quick or slow : it is simply a category mistake to assert of durationless 
eventualities that they are quick or slow, because quickness and slowness presup­
pose a variability in temporal extent that instantaneous eventualities necessarily lack. 
3. Boundaries in an Event Semantics 
Achievements have suffered an undeniable neglect in the aspectual l iterature. They 
receive no treatment in Krifka ( 1 989), which is otherwise the most expl icit event 
semantic account of aspect to date . This omission is iron ic, for we might have 
expected event semantics (of all approaches) to have delivered an analysis of 
achievements. There is also a marked tendency for achievements to be assimilated to 
accomplishments, only to be ignored (Parsons ( 1 990, p. 24), Verkuyl ( 1 993,  §2 .4» . 
More promising in th is regard are approaches that recognize achievements 
as an aspectual category in their own right. This is true of Dowty ' s  ( 1 979) original 
analysis of achievements in terms of the BECOME-operator, C. S .  Smith ' s  ( 1 99 1 )  
two-component aspectual theory , and Nauman n ' s  ( 1 995)  recent analysis of 
aspectual composition in dynamic logic. However, in none of these accounts do 
achievements actual ly denote properties of instantaneous obj ects (whether of 
instants or instantaneous eventualities). Upon closer inspection , achievements in fact 
denote ' minimal' (non-singleton) intervals or transitions, i .e . ,  objects that-although 
short-nonetheless have a duration. Consequently, the intuitive ' instantaneity of 
achievements ' gets lost in the technical implementation , and achievements tum out to 
be just short accomplishments. 
Another school speaks of achievements as denoting 'culmination points' or 
' culminations '  (e . g . ,  Moens und Steedman ( 1 988 ) ,  Kamp und Rey le ( 1 993, 
§5 . 3 .2)) .  Binnick ( 1 99 1 ,  p. 1 95) puts this view best : 
An achievement is al l  culmination;  though the achievement is possibly preceded by some activity 
(spott ing something is preceded by looking for i t ) ,  the verb refers only to the achievement phase, 
not to the preceding activity . 
However, apart from the unhappy term 'culmination ' ,  which is biased towards 
endings, whereas achievements may also denote beginnings (e . g . ,  recognize, as I 
suggested in section I ) , the more serious worry about this kind of analysis is that 
models for achievements with 'culminations'  have never been proposed. 
The perspective that I advocate is  to analyze achievements as denoting (left 
or right) boundaries of eventual ities . Pianesi and Varzi ( 1 994, pp . 5 3 3 ,  544) 
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mention in passing the idea of analysing achievements as denoting right boundaries 
of eventualities, but they do not motivate or develop it further. In fact, they do not 
present a semantics for achievements. (But this was also not their goal in that paper. ) 
My approach is inspired by work on mereotopology (e .g . ,  Pianesi and Varzi 
( 1 994) ,  B .  Smith (to appear» , but I consider it also to be in tune with Galton ' s  
( 1 994) positive attitude towards instantaneous events and MiUwoch ' s  ( 1 99 1 )  
appreciation of achievements . 
3. 1 .  Temporal Ontology 
The leading idea is that there are two basic sorts of eventualities, happenings and 
boundary happenings . Happenings consist of events, processes, and states, i.e., 
roughly comparable to the usual assortment of eventual ities familiar from an 
unsorted event semantics . 8 I say ' roughly comparable ' because a condition that I 
place on happenings is that they be self-connected (Ax 1 4  in section 3 . 1 .2 ) .  Conse­
quently , although every happening is an eventuality , not every eventuality is a 
happening. Boundary happenings, in contrast, consist of the boundaries of happen­
ings . Taken together, happenings and boundary happenings constitute the domain of 
basic eventualities. 
As a aid to intuition, I make occasional use of 'bounded interval ' diagrams 
like the one in ( 1 1 ), where z is a happening, y is the right boundary happening of z, 
and x is the body of z ( i .e . ,  x is z stripped of its left and right boundary happen ings). 
For perspicuity , x and y are abstracted and enlarged. What remains implicit in ( 1 1 )  is 
the left-to-right linear structure of time. 
( I I )  
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Not reflected in ( 1 1 ) is the possibility of constructing other eventualities 
from happenings. Suppose that we have two disjoint happenings, x and y, separated 
by a gap, such that x is earlier than y, and imagine that we ' add' them together, as in 
( 1 2) .  The result, z, is a complex eventuality that is built out of happenings but which 
at the same time is not itself a happening. (Recall that happenings are required to be 
gapless and that x and y are separated by a gap.) 
( 1 2) Z 
� 
X 
E----------:l 
We aim to bring four theories together in the formal account. The fi rst is a 
theory of parts (or mereology) . Insofar as eventualities may be parts of others, a 
theory of this re lation is indispensable .  The second is a theory of linear order. 
Eventualities are temporally ordered, and insofar as we need to make reference to the 
earl ier and later parts of an eventuality, we cannot do without a l inear order. The 
third is a theory of times. This is needed because we want to distinguish purely 
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temporal overlap among eventualities (sharing of a time) from their mereological 
overlap (sharing of a part) .  Last but not least, the fourth is a theory of eventualities, 
the main protagonists of the story . In the present context, this means that we require 
a theory of the two basic sorts , happenings and boundary happenings .  It goes 
without saying that I cannot do justice to all of the complexities resulting from this 
four-way interaction here, but the account that I propose is  guided by these consid­
erations. 
The temporal ontology is formali zed in a second-order predicate logic with 
identity, t-descriptions , and the A-operator. In addition, some means of handl ing 
non-referring  expressions i s  assumed. Although the exact choice of ontological 
primitives is somewhat flexible, for concreteness I settle on the following domains 
and relations together with their designated predicates :9  
a set  of happenings (h) 
a set of boundary happenings (bh) 
a set of intervals ( i )  
a set of points (p) 
a precedence relation « )  
a proper part relation (c: )  
I n  what follows, the unsorted variables x, Y, Z . . . range over all objects o f  the 
ontology, which includes not only happenings, boundary happenings, intervals, and 
points, but also physical objects (which , however, I do not explicitly discuss) .  While 
I do not rule out the existence of 'mixed'  objects that have (say) intervals and 
physical objects as parts, I do assume that for something to count as a temporal 
object, it must be built out of happenings, boundary happenings, intervals, or points 
(Dn O). In other words, the temporal ontology i s  grounded in  these four basic types 
of objects. 
3. J . 1 . Definitions 
To start things off, let us define the domain of basic eventualities as comprised of 
happenings and boundaries, and that of basic times as comprised of intervals and 
points : 
Df! . 
Df2 . 
Basic-Ev := Ax (h(x) v bh(X)) 
Basic-Tm := Ax (i (x) v p(x)) 
(x is a basic eventual ity) 
(x i s  a basic time) 
Turn ing to the mereological definitions, we say that an object without proper 
parts is an atom: 
Df3 .  Atom := Ax (-.,3y (yc:x) ) (x is an atom) 
The ( improper) part and overlap relations are defined in the usual manner: 
Df4.  
DfS . 
b: := AxAY (XC:Y v x=Y) 
o := AxAy (3z(zb:x  1\ Zb:Y))  
(x is part of y) 
(x and y overlap) 
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The two sum operations, general and binary, then receive the following definitions 
(where X in Df6 is a one-place predicate variable): 
Df6.  
Df7. 
cr := AXW ('il'z(zoy � 3z' (X(Z' ) /\ z' °Z)) )  
E9 := AxAytZ (Z=cr(Az' (z' bX v Z' by) )) 
(general sum of X' s) 
(binary sum of x and y) 
With the sum operation at our disposal , we can define three relevant sorts of 
temporal objects: (i) those built out of basic eventualities, (ii) those built out of basic 
times, and (iii) those built out of basic eventualities or basic times (or both) .  
Df8 . Ev :=  Ax (X=cr(AY (YbX /\ Basic-Ev(y)) )) (x is an eventuality) 
Df9.  Tm : =  Ax (X=cr(AY(YbX /\ Bosic-Tm(y)) )) (x is a time) 
Dfl O. Temp-Obj := Ax (X=cr(AY(YbX /\ (Ev(y) v Tm(y))))) 
(x is a temporal object) 
A couple of addit ional mereological operations prove to be usefu l .  The 
binary product of two objects is the largest object in their overlap, and the difference 
of two objects is the result of removing all of the parts of the second from the first. 
Df l l .  
Dfl 2 . 
® :=  AxAYtZ (Z=cr(Az' (z' bX /\ Z' by))) 
- := AXAYtZ (Z=cr(Az' (Z' !;;;; X /\ ..,(z' ° Y)))) 
(binary product of x and y) 
(difference of x and y) 
It is possible to mimic certain mereological relations using the precedence 
relation . Two temporal objects cross when neither precedes the other-thi s  is the 
analogue of overlap . An object is ( improperly) enclosed in another if everything that 
crosses the first also crosses the second. Here we have the analogue of (improper) 
part . The proper enclosure relation is an asymmetric restriction of enclosure. It 
evidently corresponds to proper part. Final ly ,  coincidence arises whenever two 
objects are enclosed in each other (mereologically, this amounts to identity) .  
Dfl 3 .  
Dfl 4 . 
Df1 5 .  
Df1 6. 
Cross := AxAY ("'(X<Y) /\ ..,(y<x)) 
Encl := AxAy ('il'z(Cross(z. x) � Cross(z. V)) ) 
Prop-Encl := AxAy(Encl(x. y) /\ ..,Encl(y. x)) 
(x and y cross) 
(x i s  enclosed in y) 
(x is properly enclosed in y) 
Coin := AxAy (Encl(x, y) /\ Encl(y. x)) (x and y coincide) 
Bear in mind that these are temporal and not mereological relations .  Happen­
ings and intervals ,  given that they are different sorts of objects, may not overlap 
mereological ly .  But they may cross. And they may even coincide. The latter obtains 
whenever the time of a happening exactly matches an interval . The possibility of this  
match suggests a way of using coincidence to define the temporal trace function: 
Dfl 7 .  '"[ := AxW(Ev(x) /\ Tm(y) /\ CoinCx. V)) (temporal trace of x) 
The temporal trace function maps eventualities to the times that they coincide with .  
We can distinguish two important ways in which temporal objects overlap. 
In order to state them, we first group boundary happenings and points together as 
thin objects: 
Df1 8 . Thn := Ax (bh(X) v p(x)) (x is th in) 
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Two objects are externally connected whenever their product is thi n . 1 o  By  
comparison, they are internally connected whenever they overlap but are no t  exter­
nally connected. 
Ofl 9 . 
Of20. 
Ex-Cn : = AxAy (3z(Thn(z) 1\ z=x®y) ) (x and y are externally connected) 
In-Cn := AxAY (X o y  1\ -,Ex-Cn(x, V)) (x and y are internally connected) 
An object is self-connected if every way of splitting it into two results in overlapping 
objects: 
Of2 l .  Self-Cn : =  Ax (VyVz(x=yE9z � yoz) ) (x is self-connected) 
Many temporal objects that are not self-connected are nevertheless made up of self­
connected objects. We saw such an example in ( 1 2) , where the happenings x and y 
are self-connected but their sum z is not. Let us say that an object is a maximally 
self-connected part of another when it is self-connected and there is no intermediate 
part properly containing it that is self-connected. In ( 1 2) both x and y are maximally 
self-connected parts of z. 
Df22. Max-Self-Cn  :=  AXAy (Self-Cn(x) 1\ xr;;;;. y 1\ -,3z (xc:z 1\ zr;;;;.y 1\ 
Self-Cn(z)) )  (x i s  a maximally self-connected part o f  y) 
Temporal objects, if they are not atoms, have distinct earlier and later parts .  
In the case of self-connected objects, an object is a left part of another if  no  other 
part precedes it, and it is a right part if no other part fol lows it. However, in order to 
allow for objects that are not self-connected, we relativize the definitions of left part 
and right part to maximally self-connected parts : 
Of23 . 
Of24. 
Lf := AXAy (3z (xr;;;;. z 1\ Max-Self-Cn(z, y) 1\ Vz' (z ' r;;;;. z � -'(z '  <x)))  
(x is a left part of y) 
Ri := AXAy (3z (xr;;;;. z 1\ Max-Self-Cn(z, y) 1\ Vz' (z' r;;;;. z � -,(x<z' )) ) 
(x is a right part of y) 
According to 0f23 , for example, both the first half of x and the first half of y in ( 1 2) 
are left parts of z. 
In order to generalize over happenings and intervals, we collect them together 
as thick objects: 
Of25 .  Thk := Ax (h(x) v i (x)) (x is thick) 
An object is a boundary part of another whenever the first is thin ,  the second 
has a thick part, and the first is part of that thick object : 
Of26 . Bd := AXAy (Thn(x) 1\ 3z (Thk(z) 1\ xr;;;;. z 1\ zr;;;;. y) ) 
(x is a boundary part of y) 
Combining definitions, we can say when one object is a left boundary part 
or a right boundary part of another: 
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Lf-Bd := AxA.y(Bd(x, y) /\ Lf(x, V)) 
Ri-Bd := A.xA.y(Bd(x, y) /\ Ri(x, V)) 
(x is a left boundary part of y) 
(x is a right boundary part of y) 
Left and right boundary parts are in general not unique. We saw this already 
in ( 1 2) ,  where the left (right) boundary parts of x and y each count as a left (right) 
boundary part of z according to Df27 (Df28) .  In order to obtain unique boundaries, 
we have to consider sums. The left boundary of a temporal object is the sum of its 
left boundary parts , its right boundary is the sum of its right boundary parts, and its 
boundary as a whole is the sum of the left and right boundaries. These notions are 
formalized as follows: 
Df29. 
DBO. 
DB I .  
�Lf : =  AxtY (y=cr(A.z(Lf-Bd(z, x)))) 
�Ri := AxtY (y=cr(A.z(Ri-Bd(z. x)))) 
� : =  AxtY (Y=�Lf(X)E9�Ri(X)) 
(left boundary of x) 
(right boundary of x) 
(boundary of x) 
In the present analysis, if a temporal object has a boundary , then the bound­
ary is part of i t-this is u l timately due to the very definition of a boundary part in 
Df26. In the axiomatic treatment to follow, in fact, all thick objects have boundaries 
(Ax 1 5 ) .  Even so,  nothing prevents us from taking a bounded obj ect  and 
mereologically subtracting its boundary . The result of doing so is  its body ( ' K' in 
Df32 is mnemonic for Korper) . l l  
Df32 .  K := AxtY (y=X-�(x)) (body of x) 
Using the notion of a body , we define the immediate precedence relation, 
which basical ly states that one object immediately precedes another whenever the 
two are externally connected and the body of the first precedes the body of the 
second .  However, in order to allow for intervals and happenings to immediately 
precede each other, given that these are never externally connected, a sl ight complica­
tion in the definition is necessary .  Specifically, we have to consider the temporal 
trace of an eventual ity whenever it immediately precedes or follows a time. 
DB3 .  <: := AxA.Y (K(X)<K(Y) /\ (Ex-Cn(x, y) v Ex-Cn(t(x), y )  v 
Ex-Cn(x, 't(Y)))) (x immediately precedes y) 
Effectively, only bounded objects may immediately precede each other. This is 
because K is not defined for objects without boundaries . Since neither bodies nor 
thin objects have boundaries, immediate precedence is not defined for them. 
3. 1 . 2. Axioms 
The axioms of the temporal ontology serve to regulate the behavior of its primitive 
objects and relations. While the proposed set of axioms may not be free of every 
redundancy, I have nevertheless endeavored to keep them economical. 
To begin with, we require that the domain of temporal objects not be empty . 
The first axiom, which guarantees the existence of a happening, fulfills this require­
ment: 
Ax ! .  3x (h(x)) (there is a happening) 
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The following three axioms stipulate that the proper part relation is a strict 
partial order without a bottom element: 
Ax2. 
Ax3 .  
Ax4. 
Vx( -.(x c X)) 
VxVyVZ ( Xcy 1\ yCZ) � XcZ) 
VxVY (Xcy � 3z(zcy 1\ -.(zo x)) )  
( i rreflexivity of  proper part) 
(transitivity of proper part) 
(witness for proper part) 
It was noted above in connection with Df6 that it is one thing to know what a general 
sum is and quite another to know whether any exist. Ax5 asserts that nonempty sets 
of objects have sums: 
Ax5 .  VX(3y(X(y)) � 3y (y=cr(X))) (existence of general sums) 
These axioms suffice to give the mereology the strength of a complete boolean 
algebra without a zero element. 
The axioms for the precedence relation are a bit more cumbersome to state, 
because now we cannot completely ignore the sortal distinctions of the ontology. 
Since the precedence relation is intended to be temporal precedence, it is natural that 
it should hold only among temporal objects (and not among physical or 'mixed' 
objects) :  
Ax6. VxVy(x<y � (Temp-Obj(x) 1\ Temp-Obj(y))) 
(precedence holds among temporal objects) 
That the precedence relation is  a strict partial order is val id for all temporal objects : 
Ax7. 
Ax8. 
Vx( -.(x<x)) 
VxVyVz( x<y 1\ y<z) � x<z) 
(irreflexivity of precedence) 
(transitivity of precedence) 
The domain of times, in particular, is linear. This principle rules out the possibil i ty 
of distinct paral lel times. S ince times are buil t  up out of basic t imes, it suffices to 
state the principle for the latter: 
Ax9. VxVy( Basic-Tm(x) 1\ Basic-Tm(y)) � (x<y v y<x v x o y)) (lineari ty) 
Finally, atomic points sati sfy density, which asserts that between any two atomic 
points there is a third atomic point. 
Ax 1 0. VxVy ( p(x) 1\ p(y) 1\ Atom(x) 1\ Atom(y)) � 
(x<y � 3z (x<z 1\ z<y 1\ p(z) 1\ Atom(z)) )) (density for points) 
The precedence relation on atomic points is a dense linear order. 
The connection between mereology and temporal precedence is revealed by 
inclusion. Essential ly, if one temporal object is a proper part of another, then the first 
is also properly enclosed in the second (Df l4) .  
Ax i l .  VxVy((Temp-Obj(x) 1\ Temp-Obj(y)) � 
(xcy � Prop-Encl(x, V))) (inclusion) 
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The next axiom guarantees that the domain of times is open :  for every 
atomic point, there are two intervals that intersect at exactly that point. 
Ax 12 .  'lix ((p(x) 1\ Atom(x» � :3y:3z (i (y) 1\ i (z) 1\ X=Y®Z)) (openness) 
There is still no direct connection enforced between eventualities and times. 
We change this with the next axiom, which requires every basic eventuality to have a 
basic time as its temporal trace: 
Ax 1 3 . 'lix (8asic-Ev(x) � :3y (8asic-T m(y) 1\ 't(x)=y) ) 
(basic eventualities require basic times) 
Since a hallmark of the present approach is the proclaimed distinction 
between thick and thin objects, we should guarantee that there really is such a 
distinction . Let us begin with three crucial properties of thick objects : (i) they are 
self-connected (Df2 1 ) , (ii) they have boundaries (Df3 1 ) ,  and (iii) they are dense. 
Ax 1 4. 
Ax I S .  
Ax 1 6 . 
'lix(Thk(x) � Self-Cn(x») (thick objects are self-connected) 
'lix(Thk(x) � :3y (y=�(x») ) (thick objects have boundaries) 
'lix(Thk(x) � :3y:3z(...,(y=z) 1\ Thk(y) 1\ Thk(z) 1\ x=yEBZ) )  
(thick objects are dense) 
Observe that density for thick objects is very different from density for atomic 
points (Ax I 0) . The density of thick obejcts entails that any thick object is the sum of 
two distinct thick objects. Consequently ,  no thick object is an atom. 1 2 
A question not addressed by these axioms concerns the upward closure 
conditions for thick objects . Here we have to treat happenings separately from 
intervals .  For intervals ,  the matter is fairly straightforward. It is reasonable to say 
that the sum of any two overlapping intervals is again an interval : 
Ax 1 7 . 'lix((i(x) 1\ i Cy) 1\ x o y) � i (xEBy») (upward closure for intervals) 
For happenings, we base the condition on internal connection (Df20), which 
effectively requires that a thick object be part of the overlap. In other words, if two 
happenings are internally connected, then their sum is a happening: 
Ax 1 8 . 'lix\fy((h(x) 1\ hey) 1\ In-Cn(x, V»� � h(xEBy») 
(upward closure for happenings) 
Thin objects are more straightforward to treat than thick objects. They 
exhibit two important features .  The first is that they are boundary parts of thick 
objects; the second is that the property of being thin is homogeneous: not only is 
every thin object the sum of atomic thin objects, but also every sum of atomic thin 
objects is thin .  
Ax 1 9 . 
Ax20. 
'lix (Thn(x) � :3y (8d(x, V») )  
(thin objects are boundary parts of  thick objects) 
'lix(Thn(x) H x=cr(Ay(Thn(y) 1\ Atom(y) 1\ Yb:x») 
(homogeneity of thinness) 
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Another way of describing the import of Ax20 is that we can never get a thick object 
by adding together thin ones. Note that not all thin objects are self-connected. For 
example, although all boundaries are thin ,  they are typically not self-connected, as 
we have seen. 
This concludes my presentation of the axioms of the temporal ontology. 
Additional axioms are imaginable, yet this collection gives a fairly clear picture of 
the intended objects and their relations . Due to lack of space, I postpone a discus­
sion of theorems of the ontology to another occasion and tum immediately to the 
semantics of achievements. 
3.2. Achievements 
I claimed in section I that the logic of achievements is the logic of beginnings and 
endings. Consequently, in order to offer an analysis of achievements, I have to say 
what beginnings and endings are. At first glance, it might appear that beginnings and 
endings are just  left boundary parts (Df27) and right boundary parts (Df28) ,  
respectively. But  this, it turns out, is not enough: beginnings and endings, unlike left 
and right boundaries ,  require reference to the types of eventualities that they are 
boundaries of. 
We say that a boundary happening begins (ends) an eventuality of type X 
just in case there is no eventual i ty immediately preceding (following) it such that the 
sum of the two eventualities is of type X: 
Df34.  
Df3S .  
Beg := AxAyAX(bh(X) /\ Ev(y) /\ Lf-Bd(x. y) /\ XCV) /\ 
...,3z (z<y /\ X(ZEBy») ) 
(boundary happening x begins eventuality y of type X) 
End := AxAyAX(bh(X) /\ Ev(y) /\ Ri-Bd(x, y) /\ XCV) /\ 
...,3z (y<z /\ X(ZEBy») ) 
(boundary happening x ends eventuality y of type X) 
Recall that s ince left (right) boundary parts are always parts of thick objects, x i n  
Df34 (Df3S)  i s  in fact part of a happening that is contained in y. The difference 
between beginnings (endings) and left (right) boundary parts is not that the former 
are not instances of the l atter (they are) ,  but rather that the former introduce more 
descriptive content than the l atter. More succinctly, beginnings (endings) are left 
(right) boundary parts under a description of what they bound. 
In presenting a semantics for achievements, i t  is convenient (although not 
absolutely essential) to assume a theory of thematic relations. I take it that such a 
theory provides a small set of thematic relations that specifies the general ways in 
which objects may participate in eventualities. I define this set disjunctively in Df36, 
where the ' . . .  ' betrays an uncertainty regarding the exact inventory of relations. 
Df36 .  Thematic := AR (R=Agent v R=Experiencer v R=Theme v 
R=Patient v . . .  ) (R is a thematic relation) 
Among the principles that a theory of thematic relations should validate in 
the present context is one which affirms that thematic re l at ions hold between 
happenings and objects that participate in those happenings . Observe that Ax2 1 
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leaves open the sortal character of the right argument of thematic relations, which 
may also be a happening (e.g. ,  The picnic took place at noon) :  
Ax2 1 .  'dR (Thematic(R) � 'dx'dy (R(x, y) � hex») ) 
(left argument of thematic relations is a happening) 
However, the real import of Ax2 1 is that only happenings have participants. 
If a complex (i .e . ,  non-basic) eventuality has participants, they may be identified with 
the participants of the happenings that make it up. In other words, complex eventual­
ities have participants in virtue of the participants that their  component happenings 
have . Boundary happenings, in contrast, have no participants .  How could one 
participate in a durationless eventuality? The difficulty of giving an intell igible 
answer to thi s  question suggests that the treatment of boundary happenings as 
fundamentally different from happenings is  on the right track. 
The paper concludes with a number of semantic derivations involving 
achievements . In each case, tense is ignored and a predicate of boundary happenings 
is  derived that syntactical ly corresponds to a (subject-internal) VP. The semantic 
composition throughout is driven by functional application. 
The first example illustrates the achievement aspectualizer begin with V-ing 
as its complement: 
( 1 3) Rebecca began cl imbing. 
[VP2 Rebeccaj [V'2 begin [VPI tj [V' I c limbing] ] ] ]  
a. begin � AXAY (3z(Beg(y, z, X») ) 
climbing � AY'Ax ' (Cl imb(x') 1\ hex') 1\ Agent(x ' , V ' ») 
Rebecca � Rebecca 
t � Z ' 
b. [Vpl Ij [V'I climbing]] � Ax' (Cl imb(x') 1\ hex ' ) 1\ Agent(x ' , z ' ») 
c. [V'2 begin [V pI tj [V'I cl imbing] ] ]  � 
Ay(3z (Beg(y, z, Ax ' (Cl imb(x' ) 1\ hex') 1\ Agent(x ' , z ' »»))  
d .  [VP2 Rebeccaj [V'2 begin [VPI t j  [V ' I  climbing]] ] ]  � 
Ay(3z(Beg(y, z, Ax' (Cl imb(x') 1\ hex ') 1\ 
Agent(x' , Rebecca»») )  
Observe that begin is treated as a raising verb. The transition from ( l 3c) t o  ( l 3d) 
requires A-abstraction of the free variable z '. The resulting formula in ( I  3d) is  a 
predicate of boundary happenings that begin a happening in which Rebecca climbs. 
For the sake of comparison, I also give an instance of the weather verb rain 
as the complement of begin : 
( 1 4) It began raining. 
a. raining � Ax' (Rain(x ' ) 1\ hex'») 
b .  [VP2 I t j  [V'2 begin [VPI I j  [V ' I  raining] ] ] ] � 
Ay(3z (Beg(y, z, Ax' (Rain(x ' )  1\ h(x'»») )  
Here neither i t  nor  its trace receives an  interpretation. The formula in ( l 4b) is a 
predicate of boundary happenings that begin a happening of raining. 
The next example shows how the relation Beg can be applied in the analysis 
of recognize, a more canonical achievement verb: 
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( 1 5) Anita recognized Peter. 
[vp Anita [v' recognize [NP Peter]] ]  
a .  recognize => 
AzAYAx (3x' (Beg(x, x' , AY' (Recognize(y' )  A hey ' )  A 
Experiencer(y' , y) A Theme(y' ,  z)) )) ) 
Anita => Anita 
Peter => Peter 
b. [vp Anita [v' recognize [NP Peter] ) ]  => 
Ax (3x '  (Beg(x, x ' ,  AY' (Recognize(y') A hey')  A 
Experiencer(y' ,  Anita) A Theme(y ' ,  Peter)) )) ) 
The predicate Recognize in ( 1 5a), a predicate of happenings, represents the stative 
verb recognize . The formula in ( 1 5b) is a predicate of boundary happenings that 
begin a (state) happening in which Anita recognizes Peter. Notice that the salient 
difference between begin and recognize is that the latter lexically specifies the type 
of happenings that the denoted boundary happenings are left boundaries of. 
For an example involving the relation E nd , consider the achievement 
aspectualizer stop taking V-ing as its complement: 
( 1 6) Rebecca stopped climbing. 
a. stop => AXAy (3z (End(y, z, X)) ) 
b. [VP2 Rebeccai [V'2 stop [VPI t i  [V ' I  cl imbing]] ] ]  => 
Ay(3z (End(y, z. Ax ' (Cl imb(x ') A hex ') A 
Agent(x ' ,  Rebecca)) ))) 
Comparing the analyses in ( 1 3 )  and ( 1 6) ,  we see that stop i s  the inverse of begin . 
The formula in ( 1 6b) is a predicate of boundary happenings that end a happening in 
which Rebecca climbs . 
Many achievement verbs denote beginnings as well as endings. As suggest­
ed in section I ,  one such example is reach: if Rebecca reaches the summit, then the 
reaching is both the ending of her climb and the beginning of her being at the 
summit. I detail this in the next derivation : 
( 1 7) Rebecca reached the summit. 
a. reach => 
AzAYAx(3x '  (End(x, X ' , AY' (Motion(y ')  A hey ' ) A 
Agent(y' ,  y) A Goal(y' ,  z)))) A 
3x" (Beg(x, x " , Ay" (Be-On(y") A h(y") A 
Theme(y", y) A Location(y " , z)) )) ) 
the summit => tZ' (summit(z ' )) 
b. [vp Rebecca [v' reach [NP the summit]) ]  => 
Ax (3x' (End(x, x ' ,  AY' (Motion(y' )  A hey ' )  A 
Agent(y ' , Rebecca) A Goal(y' ,  tz ' (summit(z ' )) )) )) A 
3x" (Beg(x, x ", Ay" (Be-At(y") A h(y") A 
Theme(y", Rebecca) A 
Location(y ", tZ' (summit(z' )) )) )) ) 
The formula in ( 1 7b) is a predicate of boundary happenings that both end a happen­
ing in which Rebecca cl imbs to the summit and begin a (state) happening in which 
she is at the summit. Strictly speaking, reach entails not a cl imbing but only a prior 
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motion happening. In this example, however, we may grant that the motion happen­
ing is a climbing. 
Endnotes 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Sinn und Bedeutung at UniversiUit 
Tiibingen on 2 1  December 1 996 and at SALT VII at Stanford University on 23 
March 1 997. Those two audiences have helped me with their questions and I thank 
Manfred Bierwisch, Tim Fernando, Hans Kamp, Ralf Naumann, and Frank Schilder 
for more detailed exchanges. I am especially grateful to Ralf Naumann for a number 
of useful discussions about achievements. Naturally, no one else necessarily agrees 
with what I have written here. This paper is based upon work supported by the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization under a Grant awarded in 1 996 and by the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (Sonderforschungsbereich 282,  Teilprojekt 
D3). Reactions are welcome at: pinon @phil-fak. uni-duesseldorfde 
1 .  The assumption is reasonable. Given that instants have zero duration, it is in fact 
difficult to imagine how something could change in no time at al l .  This view is 
corroborated by models of changes as relations between states ( i .e . ,  as state trans­
formers) ,  which are currently used in computer science: a particular state cannot 
both hold and not hold at an instant. 
2. Note that recognize is ambiguous between an achievement and a state , as is 
shown by Since Anita finally recognized Peter five minutes ago, she certainly 
recognizes him now. Although I only discuss the syntactic frame recognize + NP, 
this aspectual ambiguity is also present in the frame recognize + CP (cf. I suddenly 
recognized that my analysis had problems vs. I recognize that my analysis has 
problems). 
3. The term 'eventuality ' stems from Bach ( 1 98 1 )  and has the same extension as 
' situation ' in Mourelatos ( 1 98 1 ) , i .e . ,  as 'event' in the broad sense. 
4 .  Because of aspectual composition, an achievement at the V-level is not always an 
achievement at the VP- or IP-1evel .  Consider the contrast between Mary arrived and 
Guests arrived. The latter but not the former sentence may be interpreted as a 
complex activity : Guests arrived all day long vs. # Mary arrived all day long. 
5 .  Actual ly, the sentences in (5) may have two readings, but the one on which 
in-adverbials are synonymous with after-adverbials is much less prominent. 
6. As asked by a saleswoman in San Diego, CA on 1 7  March 1 997. 
7 .  Not to be identified with divisive reference as discussed in Krifka ( 1 989) . 
8. See Pifton ( 1 995) for a sorted ontology of events, processes , and states without 
boundaries. 
9 .  Intervals and points are also known as periods and instants, respectively .  Expres­
sions of the logical language are given in this typeface. 
1 0 . External connection among intervals in dense time is the correlate of their 
(nonoverlapping) abutment in discrete time. 
I I . The body of a bounded object is  its topological interior. 
1 2 . Landman ( 1 99 1 ,  p. 1 75)  points out that density conflicts with atomicity in 
interval structures. 
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